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Agency theory and the House bank affair

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  • Preece, Dianna C.
  • Mullineaux, Donald J.
  • Filbeck, Greg
  • Dennis, Steven A.

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  • Preece, Dianna C. & Mullineaux, Donald J. & Filbeck, Greg & Dennis, Steven A., 2004. "Agency theory and the House bank affair," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 259-267.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:revfin:v:13:y:2004:i:3:p:259-267
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Walter Novaes, 2003. "Capital Structure Choice When Managers Are in Control: Entrenchment versus Efficiency," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76(1), pages 49-82, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ece ZEYBEK YILMAZ & Göksel ATAMAN BERK, 2020. "Vekâlet Kuramına Göre Türkiye’deki Otellerin Pazara Giriş Stratejilerinin Değerlendirilmesi," Istanbul Management Journal, Istanbul University Business School, vol. 0(88), pages 145-168, June.

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