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Do investors value the acquirers’ complexity in a merger and acquisition?

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Listed:
  • Pan, Ying
  • Mai, Ngoc Thuy
  • Truong, Nguyen Nhut Vu
  • Bui, Dien Giau
  • Li, Ruihai

Abstract

Our study explores the extent to which investors consider acquirers' complexity in evaluating the performance of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We examined 1820 M&As in the US between 2002 and 2017 and found that acquirer complexity negatively impacts acquirer announcement returns. Higher levels of acquirer complexity diminish the synergy effect of acquisitions. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that this relationship is more pronounced when the acquiring firm has weaker corporate governance, lower compensation incentives, or more information asymmetry. Our study contributes to the M&A literature by highlighting the significance of acquirers' corporate structure on their M&A performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Pan, Ying & Mai, Ngoc Thuy & Truong, Nguyen Nhut Vu & Bui, Dien Giau & Li, Ruihai, 2025. "Do investors value the acquirers’ complexity in a merger and acquisition?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:99:y:2025:i:c:s1059056025001480
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2025.103985
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Complexity; M&A performance; Corporate governance; Compensation incentives; Information asymmetry; Synergy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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