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Subordinate executives’ confidence and labor investment efficiency

Author

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  • Khoo, Joye
  • Cheung, Adrian (Wai Kong)

Abstract

We examine confidence, an important type of cognitive bias, at the subordinate executive level and provide new insights to the literature on labor investment efficiency. Using a sample of US firms from 1999 to 2020, we find that firms having highly confident subordinate executives exacerbates inefficient labor investment, which is consistent with the view that highly confident subordinate executives influencing risk-taking decisions to their advantage(s), which distorts labor investment efficiency. This detrimental impact on labor investment efficiency mainly manifests in firms with weaker external governance. Our findings are robust to alternative explanations, alternative proxies for both subordinate executives’ traits and labor investment efficiency, additional control variables (including CEO traits and bias), and various approaches to addressing endogeneity issues. This study contributes to the literature by shedding light on how personal traits in the top management team matter in labor investment decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Khoo, Joye & Cheung, Adrian (Wai Kong), 2025. "Subordinate executives’ confidence and labor investment efficiency," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:98:y:2025:i:c:s1059056025000590
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2025.103896
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    Keywords

    Subordinate executives; Labor investment efficiency;

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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