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Sharpened “Real Teeth” of China's securities regulatory agency: Evidence from CEO turnover

Author

Listed:
  • Zuo, Yuehua
  • Liu, Xiaojun
  • Jiang, Feng
  • Shen, Shulin

Abstract

This study examines the real impacts of the China Securities Regulatory Commission's (CSRC) enforcement actions on CEO turnover in China's fully circulated market. Using data on Chinese publicly listed firms from 2008 to 2022, we find that misconduct behavior alone does not directly lead to CEO turnover. In contrast, CSRC's enforcement actions elicit significant negative stock market reactions for both SOEs and non-SOEs post-2016 and substantially increase the likelihood of CEO turnover, with a notably larger impact on non-SOEs. Furthermore, enforcement actions involving more severe punishments and targeting information disclosure violations and operational misconduct are more effective at compelling CEOs to step down. Potential channels through which external regulatory actions influence firms' CEO replacement decisions include reducing agency costs and enhancing information transparency. These findings suggest that the “teeth” of China's securities regulatory agency now function primarily through market-based mechanisms rather than administrative force, and these “real teeth” are being sharpened by ongoing regulatory reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Zuo, Yuehua & Liu, Xiaojun & Jiang, Feng & Shen, Shulin, 2024. "Sharpened “Real Teeth” of China's securities regulatory agency: Evidence from CEO turnover," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(PB).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:96:y:2024:i:pb:s1059056024006294
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2024.103637
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    CEO turnover; Enforcement actions; Corporate misconduct; Chinese market; Regulatory reform;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • P3 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions
    • P5 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems

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