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Family performance following share repurchases, information asymmetry and interest alignment

Author

Listed:
  • Chen, Ni-Yun
  • Liu, Chi-Chun

Abstract

Little attention has been paid to how the information asymmetry, agency costs of free cash flow and the controller involvement in the board contribute to the difference in the performance between family and non-family firms following share repurchase announcements. This study aims to make clear the above associations. This study uses OLS multiple regressions to examine the difference in the operating and market performance between family and non-family firms over two years following the repurchase announcements in a sample that contains 3800 announcements over the period 2000 and 2017. We find that family firms have better performance than non-family firms. We also find that free cash flow is positively associated with performance, and the association between performance and free cash flow is weaker for family firms than for non-family firms. Furthermore, these findings become increasingly significant when family controllers have a lower degree of involvement. Our results indicate that family firms, especially those with a lower degree of controller involvement, prefer repurchases to mitigate information asymmetry and increase interest alignment.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Ni-Yun & Liu, Chi-Chun, 2024. "Family performance following share repurchases, information asymmetry and interest alignment," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(PA).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:96:y:2024:i:pa:s1059056024005793
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2024.103587
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information asymmetry; Free cash flow; Family firms; Share repurchase announcements; Interest alignment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

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