IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/reveco/v88y2023icp1547-1564.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Corporate social network, ownership structure, and corporate financing constraints: Evidence from China

Author

Listed:
  • Zhao, Tianjiao
  • Xiao, Ming
  • Zhang, Bingshi

Abstract

Based on the stakeholder theory, we constructed a corporate social network for all publicly listed Chinese A-share enterprises on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for 2010–2017. The empirical results show that there is a negative relationship between the focal positions of the corporate social network and financing constraints. Specifically, if an enterprise is located in a more central position or occupies more structural hole positions in the network, it has fewer financing constraints. Ownership structure plays a moderating role in this relationship. The results remain robust to various robustness checks and support the information access hypothesis of social networks.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhao, Tianjiao & Xiao, Ming & Zhang, Bingshi, 2023. "Corporate social network, ownership structure, and corporate financing constraints: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 1547-1564.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:88:y:2023:i:c:p:1547-1564
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2023.07.075
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S105905602300285X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.iref.2023.07.075?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate social network; Network centrality; Structural holes; Financing constraint; Ownership structure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:88:y:2023:i:c:p:1547-1564. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620165 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.