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Lobbying for a Common External Tariff from inside and out

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  • Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu
  • Lahiri, Sajal

Abstract

We consider the interactions between domestic lobbying and cross-border lobbying in a Customs Union (CU) in determining the Common External Tariff (CET). There are two types of cross-border lobbying: (i) lobbying from member-nation firms to the governments of other CU countries, and (ii) lobbying by firms from outside to the CU nation governments. Within this context, we analyze the effect of regulations on foreign lobbying on the equilibrium lobbying levels, and on the CET. If lobbying levels are strategic complements, tightening of restrictions on lobbying from outside the CU unambiguously reduces all types of lobbying. If non-CU firms are relatively large, the CET will rise in response to tighter regulations.

Suggested Citation

  • Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu & Lahiri, Sajal, 2017. "Lobbying for a Common External Tariff from inside and out," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 98-105.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:50:y:2017:i:c:p:98-105
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2017.03.026
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    Cited by:

    1. Brodmann, Jennifer & Unsal, Omer & Hassan, M. Kabir, 2019. "Political lobbying, insider trading, and CEO compensation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 548-565.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    F13; Free trade area; Customs union; Preferential trading agreements; Domestic lobbying; Cross-border lobbying; External tariffs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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