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How are homeowners associations capitalized into property values?

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  • Meltzer, Rachel
  • Cheung, Ron

Abstract

Private homeowners associations (HOAs) levy binding fees and provide local services to members. Both should be capitalized into the value of member properties, but the net effect is ambiguous. We construct the most comprehensive, longitudinal database to date on HOAs for Florida and estimate the impact of HOAs on property values. We find that properties in HOAs sell at a premium just under 5%. The premium is strongest immediately following HOA formation and declines over time, suggesting quick capitalization of HOA benefits. Properties in larger HOAs sell for less, and this is particularly true for properties in the biggest HOAs. Finally, properties located immediately outside of an HOA sell at a premium relative to other non-HOA properties, and this premium marginally decreases (increases) in the size (frequency) of neighboring HOAs.

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  • Meltzer, Rachel & Cheung, Ron, 2014. "How are homeowners associations capitalized into property values?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 93-102.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:46:y:2014:i:c:p:93-102
    DOI: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.03.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Speyrer, Janet Furman, 1989. "The Effect of Land-Use Restrictions on Market Values of Single-Family Homes in Houston," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 117-130, June.
    2. Ron Cheung, 2005. "The Effect of Property Tax Limitations on Residential Private Governments," Working Papers wp2005_05_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    3. Ron Cheung & Rachel Meltzer, 2013. "Homeowners Associations And The Demand For Local Land Use Regulation," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 511-534, August.
    4. William H. Rogers, 2006. "A Market for Institutions: Assessing the Impact of Restrictive Covenants on Housing," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 82(4), pages 500-512.
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    6. Cheung, Ron, 2008. "The Effect of Property Tax Limitations on Residential Private Governments: The Case of Proposition 13," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 61(1), pages 35-56, March.
    7. Jeremy R. Groves, 2008. "Finding the Missing Premium: An Explanation of Home Values within Residential Community Associations," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 84(2), pages 188-208.
    8. Cheung, Ron, 2008. "The interaction between public and private governments: An empirical analysis," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 885-901, May.
    9. Hughes, William Jr. & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 1996. "Uncertain Neighborhood Effects and Restrictive Covenants," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 160-172, March.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Cheung, Ron & Salmon, Timothy C. & Xie, Kuangli, 2022. "Homeowner associations and city cohesion," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    3. Stefano Cellini & Francisco Nobre, 2023. "Business Improvement Districts and Housing Markets: Evidence from Neighborhoods in London," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0523, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    4. Bengali, Leila, 2022. "Assessing evidence for inattention to the costs of homeownership," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(PB).
    5. Fiorentina Angjellari-Dajci & Richard Cebula & Robert Boylan & C. Izard & George Gresham, 2015. "The Impact of Taxes and HOA Fees on Single-Family Home Prices," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 21(2), pages 201-211, May.
    6. Pengju Zhang, 2023. "The fiscal and economic impacts of municipal dissolution: evidence from New York," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(4), pages 948-1001, August.
    7. Kathleen Grace & Joshua C. Hall, 2019. "The Value of Residential Community Associations: Evidence from South Carolina," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 25(1), pages 121-129, February.
    8. Patrick, Carlianne & Mothorpe, Christopher, 2017. "Demand for new cities: Property value capitalization of municipal incorporation," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 78-89.

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