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Non-emptiness of the Core: low multi-dimensional decisions spaces and one-dimensional preferences

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  • DEMANGE, GABRIELLE
  • GUESNERIE, ROGER

Abstract

We consider a Society which as to make a finite dimensional collective decision, and study the "stability" of the public arrangements made in the Society when considering the threats that potential coalitions may generate. We refer for that to the standard cooperative approach based on the concept of Core, and its extension, the stable coalition structures. The present analysis aims at finding conditions with economic appeal that insures the non-emptiness of the Core.
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Suggested Citation

  • Demange, Gabrielle & Guesnerie, Roger, 1997. "Non-emptiness of the Core: low multi-dimensional decisions spaces and one-dimensional preferences," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 7-17, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:51:y:1997:i:1:p:7-17
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    Cited by:

    1. Melatos, Mark & Woodland, Alan, 2007. "Endogenous trade bloc formation in an asymmetric world," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 901-924, May.
    2. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2004. "Group Formation with Heterogeneous Sets," IDEI Working Papers 288, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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