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Is non-audit services a suitable proxy for auditor independence in the post-SOX period?

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  • Anandarajan, Asokan
  • Kleinman, Gary
  • Palmon, Dan

Abstract

Before implementation of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, researchers frequently used fees from non-audit services (NAS) as a surrogate for auditor independence. NAS is still used in this way, even though SOX has restricted the types of NAS that auditors may provide to their clients. Therefore, we pose the following question: What does the literature say about the continuing adequacy of NAS as a surrogate for auditor independence in the post-SOX era? This question is relevant to research in accounting regulation because, if NAS is no longer an adequate surrogate, then research on auditor independence may provide biased results. Overall, we find that many post-SOX studies using NAS have insignificant or counterintuitive results, whereas pre-SOX studies using NAS predominantly have significant results suggesting that NAS impairs auditor independence. Is this shift in findings because NAS is no longer an adequate proxy for independence? We discuss this issue and provide our conclusions, citing relevant research where applicable.

Suggested Citation

  • Anandarajan, Asokan & Kleinman, Gary & Palmon, Dan, 2012. "Is non-audit services a suitable proxy for auditor independence in the post-SOX period?," Research in Accounting Regulation, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 105-111.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reacre:v:24:y:2012:i:2:p:105-111
    DOI: 10.1016/j.racreg.2012.05.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rick Antle & Elizabeth Gordon & Ganapathi Narayanamoorthy & Ling Zhou, 2006. "The joint determination of audit fees, non-audit fees, and abnormal accruals," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 235-266, November.
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    6. Craswell, Allen & Stokes, Donald J. & Laughton, Janet, 2002. "Auditor independence and fee dependence," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 253-275, June.
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    8. Rick Antle & Elizabeth Gordon & Ganapathi Narayanamoorthy & Ling Zhou, 2002. "The Joint Determination of Audit Fees, Non-Audit Fees, and Abnormal Accruals," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2502, Yale School of Management, revised 02 May 2006.
    9. Divesh S. Sharma & Jagdish Sidhu, 2001. "Professionalism vs Commercialism: The Association Between Non-Audit Services (NAS) and Audit Independence," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(5-6), pages 595-630.
    10. William R. Kinney & Zoe‐Vonna Palmrose & Susan Scholz, 2004. "Auditor Independence, Non‐Audit Services, and Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 561-588, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Giuseppe Ianniello, 2015. "The effects of board and auditor independence on earnings quality: evidence from Italy," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(1), pages 229-253, February.
    2. Gary Kleinman & Betsy Beixin Lin, 2017. "Audit regulation in an international setting: Testing the impact of religion, culture, market factors, and legal code on national regulatory efforts," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 14(1), pages 62-94, February.

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