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Disclosure in corporate pension plans using a regression discontinuity design

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  • Lim, Yuree

Abstract

Disclosure affects corporate pension plans’ shrouded fees. Using a 2009 disclosure regulation of pension service providers’ fees and a regression discontinuity (RD) design, we show that pension plans subject to the disclosure requirement are more likely to report increased total administrative fees. The source of these increased fees is an increase in investment advisory and management fees. Our results are robust to various identification tests. Our evidence suggests sizable shrouded fees of approximately $27 per participant in a corporate pension plan.

Suggested Citation

  • Lim, Yuree, 2025. "Disclosure in corporate pension plans using a regression discontinuity design," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:99:y:2025:i:c:s106297692400142x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2024.101936
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate pensions; Disclosure; Regression discontinuity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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