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Existence and computation of matching equilibria

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  • Alkan, Ahmet

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  • Alkan, Ahmet, 1989. "Existence and computation of matching equilibria," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 5(2-3), pages 285-296.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:5:y:1989:i:2-3:p:285-296
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    Cited by:

    1. Caplin, Andrew & Leahy, John, 2020. "Comparative statics in markets for indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 80-94.
    2. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5kmb4ke32h9ur9159sab6hvkck is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Rodrigo A. Velez, 2020. "A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget," Papers 2002.02966, arXiv.org.
    4. Rodrigo A. Velez, 2022. "A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 93-118, July.
    5. Caplin, Andrew & Leahy, John, 2014. "A graph theoretic approach to markets for indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 112-122.
    6. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/5kmb4ke32h9ur9159sab6hvkck is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Alfred Galichon & Scott Kominers & Simon Weber, 2014. "An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Working Papers hal-03460155, HAL.
    8. Alfred Galichon & Scott Kominers & Simon Weber, 2014. "An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Working Papers hal-03460155, HAL.
    9. Rodrigo A. Velez, 2019. "Expressive mechanisms for equitable rent division on a budget," Papers 1902.02935, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2020.
    10. Ahmet Alkan & Alparslan Tuncay, 2014. "Pairing Games and Markets," Working Papers 2014.48, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    11. Alfred Galichon & Simon Weber, 2024. "Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Papers 2403.05222, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.

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