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Evolution of fairness in the mixture of the Ultimatum Game and the Dictator Game

Author

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  • Chen, Wei
  • Wu, Te
  • Li, Zhiwu
  • Wang, Long

Abstract

The Ultimatum Game characterizes the scheme to split a sum of money between the proposer and the responder. Both players benefit from the successful allocation whenever the scheme presented by the proposer is endorsed by the responder, yet both receive nothing otherwise. Meanwhile, the responder in the Dictator Game has no choice but to accept what is offered by the proposer. As both games may occur in some realistic situations, we study the population dynamics by considering the mixture of the Ultimatum Game and the Dictator Game. Mixture means a fraction of individuals play the Dictator Game with their partners while others play the Ultimatum game. We introduce degree-related assignment rules to determine who shall play the Dictator Game in the heterogeneous populations. Our results show that the evolution of fairness can be promoted by assigning an appropriate fraction of hubs to be dictators, a novel finding deviating from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where proposers tend to leave next to nothing to their responders. Our work highlights the importance of network reciprocity in enhancing the evolution of fairness.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Wei & Wu, Te & Li, Zhiwu & Wang, Long, 2019. "Evolution of fairness in the mixture of the Ultimatum Game and the Dictator Game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 519(C), pages 319-325.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:519:y:2019:i:c:p:319-325
    DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2018.12.022
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Wei & Zhu, Qianlong & Wu, Te, 2023. "Unfairness promotes the evolution of cooperation," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 438(C).
    2. Wang, Li & Jia, Xiaoyu & Pan, Xiuyu & Xia, Chengyi, 2021. "Extension of synchronizability analysis based on vital factors: Extending validity to multilayer fully coupled networks," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    3. Deng, Lili & Lin, Ying & Wang, Cheng & Xu, Ronghua & Zhou, Gengui, 2020. "Effects of coupling strength and coupling schemes between interdependent lattices on the evolutionary ultimatum game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 540(C).
    4. Wentao Yi & Chunqiao Tan, 2019. "Bertrand Game with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concern," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2019, pages 1-22, August.

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