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Multiple choice minority game

Author

Listed:
  • Chow, F.K
  • Chau, H.F

Abstract

Minority game is a model of heterogeneous players who think inductively. In this game, each player chooses one out of two alternatives every turn and those who end up in the minority side wins. It is instructive to extend the minority game by allowing players to choose one out of many alternatives. Nevertheless, such an extension is not straight-forward due to difficulties in finding a set of reasonable, unbiased and computationally feasible strategies. Here, we propose a variation of the minority game where every player has more than two options. Results of numerical simulations agree with the expectation that our multiple choices minority game exhibits similar behavior as the original two-choice minority game.

Suggested Citation

  • Chow, F.K & Chau, H.F, 2003. "Multiple choice minority game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 319(C), pages 601-615.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:319:y:2003:i:c:p:601-615
    DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4371(02)01386-9
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yang, Cheng & Sun, Shixin, 2007. "The minority game with incomplete strategies," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 379(2), pages 645-653.
    2. Kei Katahira & Yu Chen & Gaku Hashimoto & Hiroshi Okuda, 2019. "Development of an agent-based speculation game for higher reproducibility of financial stylized facts," Papers 1902.02040, arXiv.org.
    3. Katahira, Kei & Chen, Yu & Hashimoto, Gaku & Okuda, Hiroshi, 2019. "Development of an agent-based speculation game for higher reproducibility of financial stylized facts," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 524(C), pages 503-518.

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