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Minority game with arbitrary cutoffs

Author

Listed:
  • Johnson, N.F
  • Hui, P.M
  • Zheng, Dafang
  • Tai, C.W

Abstract

We study a model of a competing population of N adaptive agents, with similar capabilities, repeatedly deciding whether to attend a bar with an arbitrary cutoff L. Decisions are based upon past outcomes. The agents are only told whether the actual attendance is above or below L. For L∼N/2, the game reproduces the main features of Challet and Zhang's minority game. As L is lowered, however, the mean attendances in different runs tend to divide into two groups. The corresponding standard deviations for these two groups are very different. This grouping effect results from the dynamical feedback governing the game's time-evolution, and is not reproduced if the agents are fed a random history.

Suggested Citation

  • Johnson, N.F & Hui, P.M & Zheng, Dafang & Tai, C.W, 1999. "Minority game with arbitrary cutoffs," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 269(2), pages 493-502.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:269:y:1999:i:2:p:493-502
    DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4371(99)00117-X
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    Cited by:

    1. Lustosa, Bernardo C. & Cajueiro, Daniel O., 2010. "Constrained information minority game: How was the night at El Farol?," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 389(6), pages 1230-1238.
    2. Xu, C. & Gu, G.-Q. & Hui, P.M., 2024. "Impacts of an expert’s opinion on the collective performance of a competing population for limited resources," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 183(C).
    3. Campos, Daniel & Llebot, Josep E. & Méndez, Vicenç, 2008. "Limited resources and evolutionary learning may help to understand the mistimed reproduction in birds caused by climate change," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 16-21.

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