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Limits on executive pay and stock price crash risk: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Bai, Min
  • Wang, Renxiang
  • Yu, Chia-Feng (Jeffrey)
  • Zheng, Jianming

Abstract

By employing the mandatory pay ceiling regulation for top executives in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as a quasi-natural experiment, we investigate how limits on executive pay affect firm-specific stock price crash risk. We find that executive pay restriction has an asymmetric impact on crash risk for different types of SOEs. Specifically, while this regulation has no significant impact on crash risk for central SOEs, it significantly increases crash risk for local SOEs. Further, this positive relationship is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance, for firms with CEOs having longer tenure, older ages, and political positions, and for firms with executives losing more salary from this regulation. Overall, our findings identify a novel and unintended consequence in curbing executive remuneration and highlight the importance of distinguishing between different state ownership types.

Suggested Citation

  • Bai, Min & Wang, Renxiang & Yu, Chia-Feng (Jeffrey) & Zheng, Jianming, 2019. "Limits on executive pay and stock price crash risk: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 206-221.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:55:y:2019:i:c:p:206-221
    DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2019.04.003
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ho, Kung-Cheng & Yan, Cheng & Gozgor, Giray & Gu, Yan, 2024. "Energy related public environmental concerns and intra-firm pay gap in polluting enterprises: Evidence from China," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    2. Shan Lu & Peng Wu & Lei Gao & Richard Gifford, 2023. "Are State-Owned Enterprises Equally Reliable Information Suppliers? An Examination of the Impacts of State Ownership on Earnings Management Strategies of Chinese Enterprises," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-26, February.
    3. Kong, Dongmin & Zhu, Ling & Wang, Xin, 2022. "Anti-corruption and CEO compensation: Evidence from a natural experiment in China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    4. Bo, Xinru & Fan, Xiaomin (Michelle) & Kong, Aiguo, 2023. "The dark side of political promotion incentives: Evidence from firm performance," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    5. Bedford, Anna & Bugeja, Martin & Ghannam, Samir & Jeganathan, Davina & Ma, Nelson, 2023. "Were CEO pay cuts during the COVID-19 pandemic merely symbolic? Shareholders' reaction and outrage," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    6. Jin, Xiaoye, 2022. "Testing technical trading strategies on China's equity ETFs: A skewness perspective," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(PA).
    7. Bai, Min & Li, Shihe & Lien, Donald & Yu, Chia-Feng (Jeffrey), 2022. "The winner's curse in high-tech enterprise certification: Evidence from stock price crash risk," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Executive pay restriction; Stock Price crash risk; State-owned enterprises; Political ranks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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