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Firm growth and political institutions

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  • Boubakri, Narjess
  • El Ghoul, Sadok
  • Saffar, Walid

Abstract

Using a large sample of firms from 46 countries, we investigate the impact of political institutions on firm growth. We find that tighter political constraints stimulate firm growth and that this positive impact is more pronounced in weak legal environments. Our results are economically significant and robust to a number of sensitivity tests, including alternative proxies for political institutions, alternative measures of firm growth, additional controls, firm- versus country-level regressions, as well as when we address the endogeneity of political constraints. Our results suggest that reforms aimed at improving a country's political institutions can significantly impact firm growth, and that it is indeed through improved political institutions that firms are incentivized to invest in profitable projects.

Suggested Citation

  • Boubakri, Narjess & El Ghoul, Sadok & Saffar, Walid, 2015. "Firm growth and political institutions," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 104-125.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mulfin:v:31:y:2015:i:c:p:104-125
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mulfin.2015.05.003
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political institutions; Legal institutions; Firm growth;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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