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Information management in times of crisis

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  • Anderson, Haelim
  • Copeland, Adam

Abstract

How does information management and control affect bank stability? Following a national bank holiday in 1933, NY state bank regulators suspended the publication of balance sheets of state-charter banks for two years, whereas the national-charter bank regulator did not. This divergence in policies is used to examine how the suspension of bank-specific information affected depositors and the portfolio of assets held by banks. State-charter banks benefited, experiencing less deposit outflows than national-charter banks in 1933. Further, the behavior of bank deposits across both types of banks converged in 1934 after the introduction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Suggested Citation

  • Anderson, Haelim & Copeland, Adam, 2023. "Information management in times of crisis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 35-49.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:136:y:2023:i:c:p:35-49
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2023.01.008
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information management; Bank opacity; Banking crisis; Great depression; Depositor confidence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • N22 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-

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