Will truth out?—An advisor’s quest to appear competent
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.07.005
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2019. "Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks," ECON - Working Papers 334, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Bonatti, Alessandro & Hörner, Johannes, 2017.
"Career concerns with exponential learning,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
- Bonatti, Alessandro & Hörner, Johannes, 2017. "Career Concerns with Exponential Learning," TSE Working Papers 17-793, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Benjamin Davies, 2022. "Why do experts give simple advice?," Papers 2209.11710, arXiv.org.
- Schottmüller, Christoph, 2019.
"Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 333-360.
- Christoph Schottmüller, 2016. "Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired," Discussion Papers 16-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Pavesi, Filippo & Scotti, Massimo, 2022.
"Good lies,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
- Filippo Pavesi & Massimo Scotti, 2019. "Good Lies," Working Paper Series 39, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
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Keywords
Reputational cheap talk; Career concerns; Advisors; Strategic information transmission;All these keywords.
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