Debt, equity, and information
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.09.003
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Cited by:
- Chad Brown & Jeronimo Carballo & Alessandro Peri, 2022. "Bankruptcy Shocks and Legal Labor Markets: Evidence from the Court Competition Era," Papers 2202.00044, arXiv.org.
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Keywords
Financial contracting; Security design; Debt and equity; Monitoring; Information asymmetry; Renegotiation and bargaining;All these keywords.
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