Failures in water reform: Lessons from the Buenos Aires's concession
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- Devkar, Ganesh A. & Mahalingam, Ashwin & Deep, Akash & Thillairajan, A., 2013. "Impact of Private Sector Participation on access and quality in provision of electricity, telecom and water services in developing countries: A systematic review," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 65-81.
- Mikail Pehlivan & Nazan Susam, 2022. "Transformation of Water Services: Lessons Learned from Water Privatization in Multiple Countries," Journal of Economy Culture and Society, Istanbul University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 65(65), pages 129-160, June.
- Romano, Giulia & Guerrini, Andrea & Campedelli, Bettina, 2015. "The new Italian water tariff method: A launching point for novel infrastructures or a backwards step?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 45-53.
- Carvalho Solino Silva, Larissa & Teixeira, Gibran da Silva & Nobre Fernandez, Rodrigo & Halmenschlager, Vinícius, 2024. "Concessions for basic sanitation services in Southern Brazil: A generalized synthetic control analysis," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
- Hulya Dagdeviren, 2011. "Political Economy Of Contractual Disputes In Private Water And Sanitation:Lessons From Argentina," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 82(1), pages 25-44, March.
- Francisco Gonzalez-Gomez & Jorge Guardiola & Teresa Garcia-Muñoz, 2009. "The link between water access and subjective well-being: some methods and proposals," ThE Papers 09/02, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- Massimiliano Agovino & Massimiliano Cerciello & Antonio Garofalo & Loris Landriani & Luigi Lepore, 2021. "Corporate governance and sustainability in water utilities. The effects of decorporatisation in the city of Naples, Italy," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 874-890, February.
- Massarutto, Antonio & Ermano, Paolo, 2013. "Drowned in an inch of water," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 20-31.
- Guerrini, Andrea & Romano, Giulia, 2013. "The process of tariff setting in an unstable legal framework: An Italian case study," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 78-85.
- Landriani, Loris & Lepore, Luigi & D'Amore, Gabriella & Pozzoli, Stefano & Alvino, Federico, 2019. "Decorporatization of a municipal water utility: A case study from Italy," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 43-47.
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