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Failures in water reform: Lessons from the Buenos Aires's concession

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  • Casarin, Ariel A.
  • Delfino, Jose A.
  • Delfino, Maria Eugenia

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  • Casarin, Ariel A. & Delfino, Jose A. & Delfino, Maria Eugenia, 2007. "Failures in water reform: Lessons from the Buenos Aires's concession," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 234-247, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:15:y:2007:i:4:p:234-247
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    1. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
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    4. Tim Jenkinson, 2006. "Regulation and the Cost of Capital," Chapters, in: Michael A. Crew & David Parker (ed.), International Handbook on Economic Regulation, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. J. Luis Guasch, 2004. "Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions : Doing it Right," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 15024.
    6. Jeffry M. Netter & William L. Megginson, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June.
    7. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
    8. Dore, Mohammed H. I. & Kushner, Joseph & Zumer, Klemen, 2004. "Privatization of water in the UK and France--What can we learn?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 41-50, March.
    9. Antonio Estache & Lourdes Trujillo, 2003. "Efficiency effects of "Privatization" in Argentina's Water and Sanitation Services," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/43978, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    10. Saal, David S & Parker, David, 2001. "Productivity and Price Performance in the Privatized Water and Sewerage Companies of England and Wales," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 61-90, July.
    11. Clive Harris & John Hodges & Michael Schur, 2003. "Infrastructure Projects : A Review of Canceled Private Projects," World Bank Publications - Reports 11329, The World Bank Group.
    12. Michael A. Crew & David Parker (ed.), 2006. "International Handbook on Economic Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3330.
    13. Alcazar, Lorena & Abdala, Manuel A. & Shirley, Mary M., 2000. "The Buenos Aires water concession," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2311, The World Bank.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hulya Dagdeviren, 2011. "Political Economy Of Contractual Disputes In Private Water And Sanitation:Lessons From Argentina," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 82(1), pages 25-44, March.
    2. Francisco Gonzalez-Gomez & Jorge Guardiola & Teresa Garcia-Muñoz, 2009. "The link between water access and subjective well-being: some methods and proposals," ThE Papers 09/02, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    3. Massimiliano Agovino & Massimiliano Cerciello & Antonio Garofalo & Loris Landriani & Luigi Lepore, 2021. "Corporate governance and sustainability in water utilities. The effects of decorporatisation in the city of Naples, Italy," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 874-890, February.
    4. Massarutto, Antonio & Ermano, Paolo, 2013. "Drowned in an inch of water," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 20-31.
    5. Guerrini, Andrea & Romano, Giulia, 2013. "The process of tariff setting in an unstable legal framework: An Italian case study," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 78-85.
    6. Landriani, Loris & Lepore, Luigi & D'Amore, Gabriella & Pozzoli, Stefano & Alvino, Federico, 2019. "Decorporatization of a municipal water utility: A case study from Italy," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 43-47.
    7. Devkar, Ganesh A. & Mahalingam, Ashwin & Deep, Akash & Thillairajan, A., 2013. "Impact of Private Sector Participation on access and quality in provision of electricity, telecom and water services in developing countries: A systematic review," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 65-81.
    8. Mikail Pehlivan & Nazan Susam, 2022. "Transformation of Water Services: Lessons Learned from Water Privatization in Multiple Countries," Journal of Economy Culture and Society, Istanbul University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 65(65), pages 129-160, June.
    9. Romano, Giulia & Guerrini, Andrea & Campedelli, Bettina, 2015. "The new Italian water tariff method: A launching point for novel infrastructures or a backwards step?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 45-53.
    10. Carvalho Solino Silva, Larissa & Teixeira, Gibran da Silva & Nobre Fernandez, Rodrigo & Halmenschlager, Vinícius, 2024. "Concessions for basic sanitation services in Southern Brazil: A generalized synthetic control analysis," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).

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