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Selective decentralized leadership

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  • Silva, Emilson Caputo Delfino

Abstract

This paper examines the efficiency of decentralized leadership where regional governments contribute to the provision of multiple regional and national public goods. Unlimited decentralized leadership is inefficient because regional governments have incentives to overspend resources in the provision of regional public goods. Selective decentralized leadership is socially efficient if commitments are restricted to regional contributions to national public goods, since in this case regional governments face “correct” incentives when they contribute to national and regional public goods. The model applies to different types of national public goods. Aggregation technologies include the orthodox summation, and nonlinear and asymmetric transformation functions.

Suggested Citation

  • Silva, Emilson Caputo Delfino, 2014. "Selective decentralized leadership," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 1-5.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:83:y:2014:i:c:p:1-5
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2014.06.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    10. Naoto Aoyama & Emilson Silva, 2008. "Correlated Pollutants, Interregional Redistribution and Labor Attachment in a Federation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(3), pages 437-437, November.
    11. Arthur Caplan & Emilson Silva, 2011. "Impure public goods, matching grant rates and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(3), pages 322-336, June.
    12. Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185, September.
    13. Nobuo Akai & Emilson Silva, 2009. "Interregional redistribution as a cure to the soft budget syndrome in federations," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(1), pages 43-58, February.
    14. Boadway, Robin & Song, Zhen & Tremblay, Jean-François, 2013. "Non-cooperative pollution control in an inter-jurisdictional setting," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 783-796.
    15. Naoto Aoyama & Emilson C. D. Silva, 2010. "Equitable and Efficient Federal Structures with Decentralized Leadership, Spillovers, and Attachment of Heterogeneous Labor," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(2), pages 323-343, April.
    16. Caplan, Arthur J. & Cornes, Richard C. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 2000. "Pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 265-284, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thierry MADIÈS & Emmanuelle TAUGOURDEAU, 2019. "Decentralized leadership in a federation with competition for mobile firms: Does economic integration matter?," Working Papers 2019-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    2. Plaček Michal & Ochrana František & Půček Milan & Křápek Milan, 2017. "Does Decentralized Leadership Influence the Performance of Czech Museums?," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 10(1), pages 121-139, June.
    3. Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva & Vander Mendes Lucas, 2016. "Common labor market, attachment and spillovers in a large metropolis," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(4), pages 693-715, August.
    4. Nobuo Akai & Takahiro Watanabe, 2019. "Delegation of Taxation Authority and Multipolicy Commitment in a Decentralized Leadership Model," OSIPP Discussion Paper 19E006, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
    5. Thierry Madiès & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2017. "Decentralized leadership in a federation and competition for mobile firms: Does economic integration matter?," Working Papers 2017-73, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    6. Toshiki Tamai & Gareth Myles, 2022. "Unemployment, tax competition, and tax transfer policy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(3), pages 470-503, June.
    7. Emilson Silva, 2015. "Efficient earmarking under decentralized fiscal commitments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(4), pages 683-701, August.
    8. Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva, 2017. "Tax competition and federal equalization schemes with decentralized leadership," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(1), pages 164-178, February.
    9. João Ricardo Faria & Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva, 2020. "Leadership delegation in rotten kid families," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 33(2), pages 441-460, April.
    10. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff, 2017. "The impressive contribution of Canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(5), pages 1348-1380, December.
    11. James Natia Adam & Timothy Adams & Jean-David Gerber & Tobias Haller, 2021. "Decentralization for Increased Sustainability in Natural Resource Management? Two Cautionary Cases from Ghana," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(12), pages 1-23, June.
    12. Nobuo Akai & Takahiro Watanabe, 2023. "Electoral outcomes and local public goods provision with ex post interregional transfer," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(6), pages 1633-1655, December.
    13. Thierry Madiès & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2020. "Vertical transfers and tax competition: does trade integration matter?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 453-475, October.
    14. Emilson C.D. Silva, 2016. "Decentralized Leadership," CESifo Working Paper Series 6064, CESifo.
    15. João Ricardo Faria & Emilson C.D. Silva, 2017. "Optimal Timing in Rotten Kid Families," CESifo Working Paper Series 6333, CESifo.
    16. Rosella Levaggi & Francesco Menoncin, 2017. "Would less regional income distribution justify the present call for devolution?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(5), pages 780-799, September.
    17. Naoto Aoyama & Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva, 2023. "Efficient Decentralized Leadership under Hybrid Work and Attachment to Regions," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-18, March.
    18. Thierry MADIÈS & Emmanuelle TAUGOURDEAU, 2019. "Decentralized leadership in a federation with competition for mobile firms: Does economic integration matter?," Working Papers 2019-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    19. Nobuo Akai & Takahiro Watanabe, 2021. "Elections accelerate inefficiencies in local public good provision with decentralized leadership," OSIPP Discussion Paper 21E004, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Policy commitments; Multiple public goods; Federations; Decentralized leadership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis

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