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Strategic behavior in pooled condominium auctions

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  • Vanderporten, Bruce

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  • Vanderporten, Bruce, 1992. "Strategic behavior in pooled condominium auctions," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 123-137, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:31:y:1992:i:1:p:123-137
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    Cited by:

    1. Flavio Menezes & Paulo Monteiro, 2003. "Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(1), pages 85-98, August.
    2. Chris Jones & Flavio Menezes & Francis Vella, 2004. "Auction Price Anomalies: Evidence from Wool Auctions in Australia," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 80(250), pages 271-288, September.
    3. Menezes, Flavio Marques & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, 2001. "Why do Bidders Drop Out from a Sequential Auction," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 55(1), January.
    4. Christopher J. Meyer, 1993. "Assessing the performance of real estate auctions," Working Papers 93-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    5. Lucia Dunn & Stephen Cosslett & Tasneem Chipty, 2006. "Time Allocation and Selling Mechanisms in Outcry Auctions," Working Papers 06-02, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
    6. Yuen Leng Chow & Joseph T.L. Ooi, 2014. "First-Price Sealed-Bid Tender versus English Open Auction: Evidence from Land Auctions," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 42(2), pages 253-278, June.
    7. Archishman Chakraborty & Nandini Gupta & Rick Harbaugh, 2000. "First Impressions in a Sequential Auction," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1705, Econometric Society.

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