Should physicians team up to treat chronic diseases?
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2023.102740
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More about this item
Keywords
Referral; Chronic care; PCP; Specialist; Moral hazard; Team;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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