IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jfinec/v120y2016i3p644-660.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The value of a good credit reputation: Evidence from credit card renegotiations

Author

Listed:
  • Liberman, Andres

Abstract

I exploit a natural experiment to estimate borrowers’ willingness to pay for a good credit reputation. A lender in Chile offered lower installments to borrowers who were in default. Those who owed more than a fixed arbitrary cutoff were additionally offered a clean public repayment record. Using the cutoff in a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I show that borrowers are willing to pay the equivalent of 11% of their monthly income for a good reputation. Borrowers use their reputation to take on more debt with other banks, but default more. Thus, renegotiations may impose informational externalities on other lenders.

Suggested Citation

  • Liberman, Andres, 2016. "The value of a good credit reputation: Evidence from credit card renegotiations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 644-660.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:120:y:2016:i:3:p:644-660
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.02.004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X16300046
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.02.004?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Brown, Martin & Schmitz, Jan & Zehnder, Christian, 2024. "Communication and hidden action: A credit market experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 218(C), pages 423-455.
    2. Marieke Bos & Leonard I. Nakamura, 2014. "Should defaults be forgotten? Evidence from variation in removal of negative consumer credit information," Working Papers 14-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    3. Goodman, Sarena & Isen, Adam & Yannelis, Constantine, 2021. "A day late and a dollar short: Liquidity and household formation among student borrowers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(3), pages 1301-1323.
    4. Liberman, Andres & Paravisini, Daniel & Pathania, Vikram, 2021. "High-cost debt and perceived creditworthiness: Evidence from the UK," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 719-736.
    5. C. Badarinza & V. Balasubramaniam & T. Ramadorai, 2019. "The Household Finance Landscape in Emerging Economies," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 109-129, December.
    6. Carlos Madeira, 2020. "The impact of information laws on consumer credit access: evidence from Chile," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 873, Central Bank of Chile.
    7. Leonardo Bursztyn & Stefano Fiorin & Daniel Gottlieb & Martin Kanz, 2019. "Moral Incentives in Credit Card Debt Repayment: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1641-1683.
    8. Xin Li & Xiujuan Tian, 2022. "Research on SMEs’ Reputation Mechanism and Default Risk Based on Investors’ Financial Participation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(21), pages 1-17, November.
    9. Marieke Bos & Emily Breza & Andres Liberman, 2018. "The Labor Market Effects of Credit Market Information," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(6), pages 2005-2037.
    10. Rayenda K. Brahmana & Hui‐Wei You & Evan Lau, 2022. "Does reputation matter for firm risk in developing country?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2), pages 2110-2123, April.
    11. Andres Liberman & Christopher Neilson & Luis Opazo & Seth Zimmerman, 2018. "The Equilibrium Effects of Information Deletion: Evidence from Consumer Credit Markets," NBER Working Papers 25097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Green, Daniel & Liu, Ernest, 2021. "A dynamic theory of multiple borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(2), pages 389-404.
    13. Liberti, José & Sturgess, Jason & Sutherland, Andrew, 2022. "How voluntary information sharing systems form: Evidence from a U.S. commercial credit bureau," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 827-849.
    14. Hibbeln, Martin & Norden, Lars & Usselmann, Piet & Gürtler, Marc, 2020. "Informational synergies in consumer credit," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    15. Gerardo Pérez‐Cavazos, 2019. "Consequences of Debt Forgiveness: Strategic Default Contagion and Lender Learning," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 797-841, June.
    16. Andres Liberman & Christopher A. Neilson & Luis Opazo & Seth Zimmerman, 2019. "Equilibrium Effects of Asymmetric Information on Consumer Credit Markets," Working Papers 2019-7, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    17. Arráiz, Irani & Bruhn, Miriam & Roth, Benjamin N. & Ruiz-Ortega, Claudia & Stucchi, Rodolfo, 2021. "Borrower leakage from costly screening: Evidence from SME lending in Peru," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    18. Allen N. Berger & Christa H. S. Bouwman & Lars Norden & Raluca A. Roman & Gregory F. Udell & Teng Wang, 2024. "Piercing through Opacity: Relationships and Credit Card Lending to Consumers and Small Businesses during Normal Times and the COVID-19 Crisis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(2), pages 484-551.
    19. Bursztyn,Leonardo A. & Fiorin,Stefano & Gottlieb,Daniel Wolf & Kanz,Martin & Bursztyn,Leonardo A. & Fiorin,Stefano & Gottlieb,Daniel Wolf & Kanz,Martin, 2015. "Moral incentives : experimental evidence from repayments of an Islamic credit card," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7420, The World Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credit reputation; Renegotiation; Consumer credit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:120:y:2016:i:3:p:644-660. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.