Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply
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Cited by:
- Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses," Discussion Papers 1472, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Carlo Cambini & Yossi Spiegel, 2016. "Investment and Capital Structure of Partially Private Regulated Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 487-515, April.
- Daniel F. Spulber, 2019. "The economics of markets and platforms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 159-172, January.
- Hu Lu & Jacques Robert, 2000. "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1612, Econometric Society.
- Eric W. Bond & Thomas A. Gresik, 2011.
"Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 887-924, September.
- Thomas A. Gresik & Eric W. Bond, 2004. "Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 42, Econometric Society.
- Hanna Halaburda & Yaron Yehezkel, 2013.
"Platform Competition under Asymmetric Information,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 22-68, August.
- Hanna Halaburda & Yaron Yehezkel, 2011. "Platform Competition under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 11-05, NET Institute, revised Sep 2011.
- Eric Brousseau, 2002. "The Governance of Transactions by Commercial Intermediaries: An Analysis of the Re-engineering of Intermediation by Electronic Commerce," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 353-374.
- Raffaele Fiocco & Mario Gilli, 2016.
"Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship,"
Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 117(2), pages 93-116, March.
- Fiocco, Raffaele & Gilli, Mario, 2014. "Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 466, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/12502 is not listed on IDEAS
- Lu, Hu & Robert, Jacques, 2001. "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 50-80, March.
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