IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeeman/v49y2005i3p427-436.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Non-compliance and the quota price in an ITQ fishery

Author

Listed:
  • Hatcher, Aaron

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Hatcher, Aaron, 2005. "Non-compliance and the quota price in an ITQ fishery," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 427-436, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:49:y:2005:i:3:p:427-436
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095-0696(04)00079-8
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Batstone, C. J. & Sharp, B. M. H., 2003. "Minimum information management systems and ITQ fisheries management," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2, Supple), pages 492-504, March.
    2. Malik, Arun S., 2002. "Further Results on Permit Markets with Market Power and Cheating," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 371-390, November.
    3. Ing-Marie Andréasson-Gren, 1992. "Profits from violating controls on the use of a polluting input," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(5), pages 459-468, September.
    4. van Egteren, Henry & Weber, Marian, 1996. "Marketable Permits, Market Power, and Cheating," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 161-173, March.
    5. Ragnar Arnason, 1990. "Minimum Information Management in Fisheries," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(3), pages 630-653, August.
    6. Malik, Arun S., 1990. "Markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 97-106, March.
    7. Keeler, Andrew G., 1991. "Noncompliant firms in transferable discharge permit markets: Some extensions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 180-189, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:ags:aaea22:335749 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Murphy, James J. & Stranlund, John K., 2007. "A laboratory investigation of compliance behavior under tradable emissions rights: Implications for targeted enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 196-212, March.
    3. Murphy, James J. & Stranlund, John K., 2006. "Direct and market effects of enforcing emissions trading programs: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 217-233, October.
    4. Nøstbakken, Linda, 2013. "Formal and informal quota enforcement," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 191-215.
    5. Péreau, J.-C. & Doyen, L. & Little, L.R. & Thébaud, O., 2012. "The triple bottom line: Meeting ecological, economic and social goals with individual transferable quotas," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 419-434.
    6. John Stranlund, 2007. "The regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(1), pages 99-117, September.
    7. Itziar Lazkano & Linda Nøstbakken, 2016. "Quota Enforcement and Capital Investment in Natural Resource Industries," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(3), pages 339-354.
    8. Asproudis, Elias & Filippiadis, Eleftherios, 2021. "Bargaining for Community Fishing Quotas," MPRA Paper 107409, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Aaron Hatcher, 2007. "Firm behaviour under pollution ratio standards with non-compliance," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(1), pages 89-98, September.
    10. Stranlund, John K., 2006. "Risk Aversion and Compliance in Markets for Pollution Control," Working Paper Series 14522, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
    11. Akpalu, Wisdom, 2011. "Determinants of noncompliance with light attraction regulation among inshore fishers in Ghana," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 172-177, April.
    12. Hatcher, Aaron, 2012. "Market power and compliance with output quotas," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 255-269.
    13. Pasquale Scandizzo & Odin Knudsen, 2012. "Risk management and regulation compliance with tradable permits under dynamic uncertainty," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 127-157, February.
    14. Hugo Salgado & Carlos Chávez, 2016. "Using Taxes to Deter Illegal Fishing in ITQ Systems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 64(4), pages 709-724, August.
    15. Pauli Lappi, 2017. "Emissions trading, non-compliance and bankable permits," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(6), pages 1081-1099, December.
    16. Aaron Hatcher & Linda Nøstbakken, 2015. "Quota Setting and Enforcement Choice in a Shared Fishery," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 61(4), pages 559-575, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Murphy, James J. & Stranlund, John K., 2007. "A laboratory investigation of compliance behavior under tradable emissions rights: Implications for targeted enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 196-212, March.
    2. Stranlund, John K. & Murphy, James J. & Spraggon, John M., 2011. "An experimental analysis of compliance in dynamic emissions markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 414-429.
    3. Alessio D’Amato & Edilio Valentini, 2011. "Enforcement and environmental quality in a decentralized emission trading system," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 141-159, October.
    4. John Stranlund, 2007. "The regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(1), pages 99-117, September.
    5. Olivier Rousse & Benoît Sévi, 2005. "Behavioral Heterogeneity in the US Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Allowance Trading Program," ERSA conference papers ersa05p550, European Regional Science Association.
    6. Murphy, James J. & Stranlund, John K., 2006. "Direct and market effects of enforcing emissions trading programs: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 217-233, October.
    7. Konishi, Hideki, 2005. "Intergovernmental versus intersource emissions trading when firms are noncompliant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 235-261, March.
    8. Stranlund, John K., 2006. "Risk Aversion and Compliance in Markets for Pollution Control," Working Paper Series 14522, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
    9. Holland, Stephen P. & Moore, Michael R., 2013. "Market design in cap and trade programs: Permit validity and compliance timing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 671-687.
    10. Aaron Hatcher, 2007. "Firm behaviour under pollution ratio standards with non-compliance," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(1), pages 89-98, September.
    11. Sang-Ho Lee & Sang-Ha Park, 2005. "Tradable Emission Permits Regulations: The Role of Product Differentiation," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 4(3), pages 249-261, December.
    12. Stranlund, John K. & Murphy, James J. & Spraggon, John M. & Zirogiannis, Nikolaos, 2019. "Tying enforcement to prices in emissions markets: An experimental evaluation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    13. Stranlund, John K. & Moffitt, L. Joe, 2014. "Enforcement and price controls in emissions trading," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 20-38.
    14. Phillia Restiani & Regina Betz, 2010. "A Theoretical Model of Optimal Compliance Decisions under Different Penalty Designs in Emissions Trading Markets," Environmental Economics Research Hub Research Reports 1086, Environmental Economics Research Hub, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    15. Murphy, James J. & Stranlund, John K., 2003. "An Experimental Analysis Of Compliance Behavior In Emissions Trading Programs: Some Preliminary Results," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22039, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    16. Fulton, Murray E. & Mihal, Daniela, 2005. "The Economic Impact of Non-Compliance in the Carbon-Offset Market," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19179, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    17. Stranlund, John K., 2010. "Should we impose emissions taxes that firms evade?," Working Paper Series 93967, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
    18. Stranlund, John K. & Dhanda, Kanwalroop Kathy, 1999. "Endogenous Monitoring and Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 267-282, November.
    19. Pauli Lappi, 2017. "Emissions trading, non-compliance and bankable permits," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(6), pages 1081-1099, December.
    20. Stranlund, John K. & Chávez, Carlos A. & Villena, Mauricio G., 2009. "The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 183-191, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:49:y:2005:i:3:p:427-436. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.