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The Political Economy of (Lacking) Commitment to Green Policies

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  • Delfgaauw, Josse
  • Swank, Otto

Abstract

The IPCC (2022) views political commitment to policies as a prerequisite for mitigating climate change. We study an environment where citizens’ incentives to invest depend on future policy decisions. In turn, political support for future policies depends on citizens’ investment decisions, as these policies redistribute towards citizens who invest. We show that such redistributive concerns distort politicians’ incentives to commit. Our model explains why redistributive concerns induced some governments to choose extensive commitment by providing price certainty to investors in renewable energy for 20 years. Our model also explains why redistributive concerns can hinder commitment to green policies as suggested by the IPCC. Finally, we show that redistributive concerns can provide credibility to a policy, even if the policy is inefficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Delfgaauw, Josse & Swank, Otto, 2025. "The Political Economy of (Lacking) Commitment to Green Policies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:130:y:2025:i:c:s0095069625000178
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2025.103133
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Commitment; Flexibility; Redistribution; Median voter; Climate policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects

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