IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeeman/v128y2024ics0095069624001190.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Barrett's paradox of cooperation: A full analytical proof 30 years after

Author

Listed:
  • Finus, Michael
  • Furini, Francesco
  • Rohrer, Anna Viktoria

Abstract

In his seminal paper, Barrett (1994) argues that international environmental agreements (IEAs) are typically not successful, which he coined "the paradox of cooperation". If the potential gains from full cooperation would be large, self-enforcing IEAs have low participation and, therefore, cannot achieve much, or, if the potential gains are small, agreements are not important, even though IEAs may enjoy large participation. This message has been reiterated by several subsequent papers. Even though these papers explain the driving forces of the paradox, the analysis of membership in stable agreements and the actual and potential gains from cooperation are still mainly based on simulations. In this paper, we provide a full analytical characterization of all items on which the paradox of cooperation is based.

Suggested Citation

  • Finus, Michael & Furini, Francesco & Rohrer, Anna Viktoria, 2024. "Barrett's paradox of cooperation: A full analytical proof 30 years after," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:128:y:2024:i:c:s0095069624001190
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2024.103045
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624001190
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jeem.2024.103045?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    International environmental agreements; Stability; Paradox of cooperation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:128:y:2024:i:c:s0095069624001190. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.