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Doing more for less? New evidence on lobbying and government contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Ağca, Şenay
  • Igan, Deniz
  • Li, Fuhong
  • Mishra, Prachi

Abstract

This paper exploits the unanticipated sequestration of federal budget accounts in March 2013 to examine how contractors adjusted lobbying activities in response to the sequester. The sequestration reduced the funds disbursed through procurement. Firms with limited exposure to these cuts reduced lobbying spending after the event, whereas firms with high exposure maintained, or even increased, lobbying expenses. More affected firms appear to have intensified lobbying efforts to distinguish themselves, and to improve their chances of procuring a larger share of the reduced pie. These effects are stronger for government-dependent sectors and sectors where competition is more intense. Firms that increased lobbying obtained more contracts after sequestration. Overall evidence points towards the existence of a preferential treatment motive of lobbying. At the same time, we cannot rule out that lobbying may also serve an information-revealing purpose.

Suggested Citation

  • Ağca, Şenay & Igan, Deniz & Li, Fuhong & Mishra, Prachi, 2025. "Doing more for less? New evidence on lobbying and government contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:232:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125000629
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106942
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political connections; Lobbying; Government spending; Procurement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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