IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v218y2024icp68-88.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the shareholders versus stakeholders debate

Author

Listed:
  • Bejan, Camelia

Abstract

When externalities are present, is the inclusion of the affected stakeholders in the firm's decision process a better solution than the shareholder governance? This paper argues that the internalization of the externality hinges on the available information and the market strategy used by the firm rather than its governance structure. In the absence of income effects (i.e., if preferences are quasi-linear), a market for “customer rights” reveals all the necessary information about the surplus of a homogeneous consumer population. In that case, a Coase-type equivalence obtains: whether the firm uses the information in the interest of its shareholders or all its stakeholders, the outcome in each case is an efficient allocation. With income effects, the market for customer rights may fail. Still, if appropriate information can be obtained, efficiency can be achieved under both governance structures (or neither).

Suggested Citation

  • Bejan, Camelia, 2024. "On the shareholders versus stakeholders debate," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 218(C), pages 68-88.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:218:y:2024:i:c:p:68-88
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.11.031
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268123004377
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.11.031?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marc Fleurbaey & Grégory Ponthière, 2023. "The Stakeholder Corporation and Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(9), pages 2556-2594.
    2. Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 32-42, January.
    3. Becht, Marco & Bolton, Patrick & Roell, Ailsa, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-109, Elsevier.
    4. Giovanni Cespa & Giacinta Cestone, 2007. "Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 741-771, September.
    5. Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Corporate Governance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 1-35, January.
    6. M. Pagano & P. F. Volpin, 2005. "Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(2), pages 841-868, April.
    7. Franklin Allen, 2005. "Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 21(2), pages 164-177, Summer.
    8. Edward E. Schlee & M. Ali Khan, 2022. "Money Metrics In Applied Welfare Analysis: A Saddlepoint Rehabilitation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(1), pages 189-210, February.
    9. Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti & Robert Marquez, 2015. "Stakeholder Governance, Competition, and Firm Value," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(3), pages 1315-1346.
    10. Camelia Bejan, 2008. "The objective of a privately owned firm under imperfect competition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(1), pages 99-118, October.
    11. Hart, Oliver D. & Zingales, Luigi, 2022. "The New Corporate Governance," Working Papers 317, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    12. Bejan, Camelia, 2021. "On the inefficiency of perfect price discrimination," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    13. Oliver D. Hart & Luigi Zingales, 2022. "The New Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 29975, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii & Jean‐Charles Rochet, 2015. "A Theory of the Stakeholder Corporation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(5), pages 1685-1725, September.
    15. Aaron S. Edlin & Mario Epelbaum & Walter P. Heller, 1998. "Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient?: Welfare and Existence in General Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 897-922, July.
    16. Camelia Bejan, 2020. "Investment and financing in incomplete markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(1), pages 149-182, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Krüger, Philipp, 2015. "Corporate goodness and shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 304-329.
    2. Diego Prior & Jordi Surroca & Josep A. Tribó, 2008. "Are Socially Responsible Managers Really Ethical? Exploring the Relationship Between Earnings Management and Corporate Social Responsibility," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 160-177, May.
    3. Chilosi, Alberto & Damiani, Mirella, 2007. "Stakeholders vs. shareholders in corporate governance," MPRA Paper 2334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Champagne, Claudia & Coggins, Frank & Sodjahin, Amos, 2022. "Can extra-financial ratings serve as an indicator of ESG risk?," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    5. Pagano, Marco & Volpin, Paolo, 2005. "Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development and Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 5378, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Yi Si & Chongwu Xia, 2023. "The Effect of Human Capital on Stock Price Crash Risk," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 187(3), pages 589-609, October.
    7. Anagnostopoulou, Seraina C. & Tsekrekos, Andrianos E. & Voulgaris, Georgios, 2021. "Accounting conservatism and corporate social responsibility," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(4).
    8. Ormazabal, Gaizka, 2018. "The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: A View from Accounting Research," CEPR Discussion Papers 12775, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Giovanni Cespa & Giacinta Cestone, 2007. "Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 741-771, September.
    10. Mohamed Arouri & Guillaume Pijourlet, 2017. "CSR Performance and the Value of Cash Holdings: International Evidence," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 140(2), pages 263-284, January.
    11. Isabel Gutierrez & Jordi Surroca, 2014. "Revisiting corporate governance through the lens of the Spanish evidence," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(4), pages 989-1017, November.
    12. Jiao, Yawen, 2010. "Stakeholder welfare and firm value," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 2549-2561, October.
    13. Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti & Robert Marquez, 2015. "Stakeholder Governance, Competition, and Firm Value," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(3), pages 1315-1346.
    14. Ni, Xiaoran & Song, Wei & Yao, Jiaquan, 2020. "Stakeholder orientation and corporate payout policy: Insights from state legal shocks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    15. Jo, Hoje & Song, Moon H. & Tsang, Albert, 2016. "Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder governance around the world," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 42-69.
    16. Marshall, Andrew & Rao, Sandeep & Roy, Partha P. & Thapa, Chandra, 2022. "Mandatory corporate social responsibility and foreign institutional investor preferences," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    17. Olga Lazareva & Andrei Rachinsky & Sergey Stepanov, 2008. "A Survey of Corporate Governance in Russia," Springer Books, in: Robert W. McGee (ed.), Corporate Governance in Transition Economies, chapter 32, pages 315-349, Springer.
    18. Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena & Marquez, Robert, 2013. "Stakeholder Governance, Competition and Firm Value," Working Papers 13-33, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    19. Prior, Diego & Surroca Aguilar, Jorge & Tribo Gine, José Antonio, 2007. "Earnings management and corporate social responsibility," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB wb062306, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
    20. Maretno Harjoto & Hoje Jo, 2011. "Corporate Governance and CSR Nexus," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 100(1), pages 45-67, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Firm's objective; Incomplete markets; Shareholders versus stakeholders; Externalities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:218:y:2024:i:c:p:68-88. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.