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When time is not on our side: The costs of regulatory forbearance in the closure of insolvent banks

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  • Cole, Rebel A.
  • White, Lawrence J.

Abstract

In this paper, we empirically estimate the costs of delay in the FDIC's closures of 433 commercial banks between 2007 and 2014 based upon a counterfactual closure regime. We find that the costs of delay could have been as high as $18.5 billion, or 37% of the FDIC's estimated costs of closure of $49.8 billion. We think that these findings call for a more aggressive stance by bank regulators with respect to the provisions for loan losses and write-downs of banks’ non-performing assets. More aggressive (and earlier) provisions and write-downs, or adoption of a capital ratio that penalizes nonperforming loans, would allow the concept of “prompt corrective action” (PCA) to play the role that it was meant to play in reducing FDIC losses from insolvent banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Cole, Rebel A. & White, Lawrence J., 2017. "When time is not on our side: The costs of regulatory forbearance in the closure of insolvent banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 235-249.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:80:y:2017:i:c:p:235-249
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.03.010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Martynova, Natalya & Perotti, Enrico C. & Suárez, Javier, 2020. "Bank capital forbearance and serial gambling," Discussion Papers 56/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    2. repec:zbw:bofitp:2019_006 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Martynova, Natalya & Perotti, Enrico & Suarez, Javier, 2022. "Capital forbearance in the bank recovery and resolution game," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 884-904.
    4. Mikhail Mamonov, 2023. "Measuring Fraud in Banking and its Impact on the Economy: A Quasi-Natural Experiment," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp755, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    5. Martynova, Natalya & Perotti, Enrico & Suarez, Javier, 2019. "Bank capital forbearance," ESRB Working Paper Series 93, European Systemic Risk Board.
    6. Kostrov, Alexander & Mamonov, Mikhail, 2019. "The formation of hidden negative capital in banking : A product mismatch hypothesis," BOFIT Discussion Papers 6/2019, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    7. John Kandrac & Bernd Schlusche, 2017. "The Effect of Bank Supervision on Risk Taking : Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-079, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    8. Fang, Cao & Yeager, Timothy J., 2020. "A historical loss approach to community bank stress testing," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    9. Igan, Deniz & Lambert, Thomas & Wagner, Wolf & Zhang, Eden Quxian, 2022. "Winning connections? Special interests and the sale of failed banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    10. John Gallemore, 2023. "Bank financial reporting opacity and regulatory intervention," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 1765-1810, September.
    11. Sana Zidi & Boutheina Regaieg & Nessrine Hamzaoui, 2021. "The Determinants of the European Banking Crisis," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 11(4), pages 115-122.
    12. James R. Barth & Stephen Matteo Miller, 2018. "On the Rising Complexity of Bank Regulatory Capital Requirements: From Global Guidelines to their United States (US) Implementation," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-33, November.
    13. Balla, Eliana & Mazur, Laurel C. & Prescott, Edward Simpson & Walter, John R., 2019. "A comparison of community bank failures and FDIC losses in the 1986–92 and 2007–13 banking crises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 1-15.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank; Bank failure; CAMELS; Commercial real estate; Failure cost; FDIC; Financial crisis; Forbearance; Insolvent;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G17 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Financial Forecasting and Simulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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