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Do banks really monitor? Evidence from CEO succession decisions

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  • Marshall, Andrew
  • McCann, Laura
  • McColgan, Patrick

Abstract

We demonstrate that banks play an important monitoring role in CEO succession that is not observed for other types of lenders, particularly public bondholders. There is a stronger relation between cash flow performance and forced CEO turnover for firms issuing bank debt during the year of CEO turnover than for firms not issuing bank debt, and bank debt issuance increases the likelihood of external CEO succession. The stock price reaction to CEO succession is higher when bank monitoring is prevalent. Our results are consistent with theories of relationship banking that propose a valuable monitoring role for well informed, incentivized bank lenders.

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  • Marshall, Andrew & McCann, Laura & McColgan, Patrick, 2014. "Do banks really monitor? Evidence from CEO succession decisions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 118-131.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:46:y:2014:i:c:p:118-131
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.05.017
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank debt; CEO succession; Lender monitoring; External succession;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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