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Liquidation under moral hazard: Optimal debt maturity and loan commitments

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  • Houston, Joel F.
  • Venkataraman, S.

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  • Houston, Joel F. & Venkataraman, S., 1996. "Liquidation under moral hazard: Optimal debt maturity and loan commitments," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 115-133, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:20:y:1996:i:1:p:115-133
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    1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(1), pages 1-41.
    2. Thakor, Anjan V., 1982. "Toward a theory of bank loan commitments," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 55-83, March.
    3. Melnik, Arie & Plaut, Steven, 1986. "Loan Commitment Contracts, Terms of Lending, and Credit Allocation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(2), pages 425-435, June.
    4. Franklin Allen, 1989. "The changing nature of debt and equity; a financial perspective," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 33, pages 12-48.
    5. Thakor, Anjan V, 1989. "Competitive Equilibrium with Type Convergence in an Asymmetrically Informed Market," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 49-71.
    6. Boot, Arnoud & Thakor, Anjan V. & Udell, Gregory F., 1987. "Competition, risk neutrality and loan commitments," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 449-471, September.
    7. Haugen, Robert A & Senbet, Lemma W, 1978. "The Insignificance of Bankruptcy Costs to the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 33(2), pages 383-393, May.
    8. Titman, Sheridan, 1984. "The effect of capital structure on a firm's liquidation decision," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 137-151, March.
    9. Thakor, Anjan V. & Udell, Gregory F., 1987. "An economic rationale for the pricing structure of bank loan commitments," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 271-289, June.
    10. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1990. "Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(2), pages 321-349, June.
    11. Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(4), pages 647-663.
    12. Chang, Chun, 1990. "The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 68-86, October.
    13. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    14. Flannery, Mark J, 1986. "Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(1), pages 19-37, March.
    15. Berkovitch, Elazar & Kim, E Han, 1990. "Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced Over- and Under-Investment Incentives," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 765-794, July.
    16. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    17. Diamond, Douglas W., 1993. "Seniority and maturity of debt contracts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 341-368, June.
    18. Chiesa, Gabriella, 1992. "Debt and warrants: Agency problems and mechanism design," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 237-254, September.
    19. White, Michelle J, 1989. "The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 129-151, Spring.
    20. Berkovitch, Elazar & Greenbaum, Stuart I., 1991. "The Loan Commitment as an Optimal Financing Contract," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(1), pages 83-95, March.
    21. Kanatas, George, 1987. "Commercial paper, bank reserve requirements, and the informational role of loan commitments," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 425-448, September.
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    3. Demiroglu, Cem & James, Christopher, 2011. "The use of bank lines of credit in corporate liquidity management: A review of empirical evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 775-782, April.
    4. Catherine C. Benjamin & Euan Phimister & . Royal Economic Society,londres (gbr), 1999. "Does loan type affect investment ? A comparison using French and British farm level panel data [Influence des sources de financements sur les décisions d'investissement des exploitations agricoles.," Post-Print hal-02838149, HAL.

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