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Impact of risk oversight functions on bank risk: Evidence from the Dodd-Frank Act

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  • Balasubramanyan, Lakshmi
  • Daniel, Naveen D.
  • Haubrich, Joseph G
  • Naveen, Lalitha

Abstract

We document the impact of having a risk committee (RC) and a chief risk officer (CRO) on bank risk using the passage of the Dodd Frank Act as a natural experiment. The Act requires bank holding companies with over $10B of assets to have an RC to oversee risk management, while those with over $50B of assets are additionally required to have a CRO. We use difference-in-difference and regression discontinuity approaches to estimate the change in risk following RC and CRO adoption. Overall, we find no evidence that the RC or CRO have a causal impact on bank risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Balasubramanyan, Lakshmi & Daniel, Naveen D. & Haubrich, Joseph G & Naveen, Lalitha, 2024. "Impact of risk oversight functions on bank risk: Evidence from the Dodd-Frank Act," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:158:y:2024:i:c:s0378426623002352
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.107049
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