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Discussion of ‘Importing Activists: Determinants and Consequences of Increased Cross-border shareholder activism’

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  • Lowry, Michelle

Abstract

Maffett et al. (2022) [Importing Activists: Determinants and Consequences of Increased Cross-border shareholder activism. Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming] find that regulations on shareholder engagement and board structure lead to increased shareholder activism. How generalizable is this conclusion: can we conclude more generally that shareholder empowering regulations contribute to increased shareholder engagement? I discuss three areas along which future research can increase our understanding of this bigger picture question.

Suggested Citation

  • Lowry, Michelle, 2022. "Discussion of ‘Importing Activists: Determinants and Consequences of Increased Cross-border shareholder activism’," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:74:y:2022:i:2:s0165410122000635
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101540
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    References listed on IDEAS

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