Bicameralism: When are two decisions better than one?
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Cited by:
- Schneider, Friedrich G., 2009. "Is a Federal European Constitution for an enlarged European Union necessary? Some preliminary suggestions using public choice analysis," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 83, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- Stefan Voigt, 2011.
"Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 205-256, January.
- Stefan Voigt, 2009. "Positive Constitutional Economics II—A Survey of Recent Developments," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200936, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Giovanni Facchini & Cecilia Testa, 2016.
"Corruption and bicameral reforms,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 387-411, August.
- Facchini, Giovanni & Testa, Cecilia, 2016. "Corruption and Bicameral Reforms," CEPR Discussion Papers 11281, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Eicher, Theo S. & García-Peñalosa, Cecilia & Kuenzel, David J., 2018.
"Constitutional rules as determinants of social infrastructure,"
Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 182-209.
- Theo Eicher & Cecilia Garcia-Peñalosa & David Kuenzel, 2018. "Constitutional rules as determinants of social infrastructure," Post-Print hal-01981017, HAL.
- Theo S. Eicher & Cecilia García-Peñalosa & David J. Kuenzel, 2018. "Constitutional rules as determinants of social infrastructure," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2018-004, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
- repec:got:cegedp:83 is not listed on IDEAS
- Paul Chambers, 2009. "Superfluous, Mischievous or Emancipating? Thailand’s Evolving Senate Today," Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Institute of Asian Studies, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, vol. 28(3), pages 3-38.
- Andreas Kyriacou, 2009. "Decision rules, membership and political centralization in the European Union," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 143-158, April.
- Giovanni Facchini & Cecilia Testa, 2009. "Reforming Legislatures: Is one House better than two?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2659, CESifo.
- John Charles Bradbury & W. Mark Crain, 2002. "Bicameral Legislatures and Fiscal Policy," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 68(3), pages 646-659, January.
- James R. Rogers, 2001. "An Informational Rationale for Congruent Bicameralism," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 13(2), pages 123-151, April.
- Casper Hunnerup Dahl, 2014. "Parties and institutions: empirical evidence on veto players and the growth of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 415-433, June.
- Maria Gallego, David Scoones, 2005. "The Art of Compromise," Working Papers eg0042, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005.
- Dongwon Lee, 2016. "Supermajority rule and bicameral bargaining," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 53-75, October.
- Lars Feld, 2005.
"The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 417-448, March.
- Lars P. Feld, 2004. "The European Constitution Project from the Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200415, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Lars P. Feld, 2005. "The European Constitution Project from the Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-20, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- David M. Primo, 2010. "The Effect of Initiatives on Local Government Spending," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(1), pages 6-25, January.
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