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Lowest-Unmatched Price Auctions

Author

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  • Eichberger, Jürgen
  • Vinogradov, Dmitri

Abstract

Lowest-Unmatched Price Auctions (LUPAs) specify that the lowest bid placed by only one participant wins. They are used in internet trading and TV and radio shows. We model LUPAs as games with minimal restrictions, in particular allowing players to place more than one bid, since multiple bids have been observed in most actual LUPAs. Though LUPAs are games for which a closed-form solution does not seem to exist in general, our model generates several testable implications about the type of strategies played in equilibrium and the highest bid in a given LUPA. Our analysis suggests that players follow strategic considerations and arrive at decisions which, at least in the aggregate, are generally consistent with theoretical predictions, yet there are some remarkable deviations.

Suggested Citation

  • Eichberger, Jürgen & Vinogradov, Dmitri, 2015. "Lowest-Unmatched Price Auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 1-17.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:43:y:2015:i:c:p:1-17
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.07.004
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dmitri Vinogradov & Yousef Makhlouf, 2021. "Signaling probabilities in ambiguity: who reacts to vague news?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 371-404, May.
    2. Dmitri Vinogradov & Yousef Makhlouf, 2017. "Signaling Probabilities in Ambiguity: on the impact of vague news," Working Papers 2017_12, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    3. Eichberger, Jürgen & Vinogradov, Dmitri, 2016. "Efficiency of Lowest-Unmatched Price Auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 98-102.
    4. Andrea Gallice, 2008. "Lowest Unique Bid Auctions over the Internet: Ability, Lottery or Scam?," Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena 0608, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena.
    5. Damian S. Damianov & Ronald Peeters, 2018. "Prize‐Based Mechanisms For Fund‐Raising: Theory And Experiments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1562-1584, July.
    6. Adam Dominiak & Ani Guerdjikova, 2021. "Special Issue on Ambiguity and Strategic Interactions in Honor of Jürgen Eichberger," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 301-307, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unmatched bid auction; Bidding behavior; Overbidding;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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