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The effect of asymmetric entry costs on Bertrand competition

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  • Thomas, Charles J.

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  • Thomas, Charles J., 2002. "The effect of asymmetric entry costs on Bertrand competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 589-609, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:20:y:2002:i:5:p:589-609
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Maarten Janssen & Eric Rasmusen, 2002. "Bertrand Competition Under Uncertainty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 11-21, March.
    2. Elberfeld, Walter & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1999. "A dynamic model of Bertrand competition with entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 513-525, May.
    3. Simon P. Anderson & Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1998. "Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All-Pay Auction," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 225-250, Springer.
    4. Marquez, Robert, 1997. "A note on Bertrand competition with asymmetric fixed costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 87-96, November.
    5. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-599, June.
    6. Sharkey, William W. & Sibley, David S., 1993. "A Bertrand model of pricing and entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 199-206.
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    Cited by:

    1. Israel J. Hernández & Elena Huergo Orejas, 2004. "Entrada y Competencia en los Servicios de Telecomunicaciones," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 0404, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
    2. Sela, Aner & Kaplan, Todd, 2003. "Auctions with Private Entry Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 4080, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Todd Kaplan & Aner Sela, 2022. "Second-Price Auctions with Private Entry Costs," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(5), pages 1-14, September.
    4. Thomas, Charles J., 2004. "The competitive effects of mergers between asymmetric firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 679-692, May.
    5. Vintila Alexandra & Roman Mihai Daniel, 2021. "Bertrand competition under asymmetric conditions," Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence, Sciendo, vol. 15(1), pages 235-244, December.
    6. Joao Montez & Nicolas Schutz, 2021. "All-Pay Oligopolies: Price Competition with Unobservable Inventory Choices [Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(5), pages 2407-2438.
    7. Meza, Sergio & Tombak, Mihkel, 2009. "Endogenous location leadership," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 687-707, November.

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