IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/iepoli/v69y2024ics0167624524000349.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

“I don't care about cookies!” data disclosure and time-inconsistent users

Author

Listed:
  • Abrardi, Laura
  • Cambini, Carlo
  • Hoernig, Steffen

Abstract

Time-inconsistent internet users neglect future privacy costs and release too much data to digital firms. We study how regulation that requires user consent for data processing affects firm profits, user surplus, and welfare, depending on the degree of time inconsistency and on firms' business models. If the firm appropriates sufficiently high profits from data, consent mechanisms increase welfare only if their design facilitates consent refusal and time inconsistency is neither too high nor too low. If firms can make it difficult to opt out, it may be better for society to let the former choose the disclosure level. However, consent policies increase user surplus when time inconsistency is high. Voluntary caps on usage can raise profits by making some users disclose more data.

Suggested Citation

  • Abrardi, Laura & Cambini, Carlo & Hoernig, Steffen, 2024. "“I don't care about cookies!” data disclosure and time-inconsistent users," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:69:y:2024:i:c:s0167624524000349
    DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2024.101112
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167624524000349
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2024.101112?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Data disclosure; Time inconsistency; Privacy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:69:y:2024:i:c:s0167624524000349. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505549 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.