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Mechanisms and effects of public reporting of surgeon outcomes: A systematic review of the literature

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  • Behrendt, Katja
  • Groene, Oliver

Abstract

Public reporting of surgeon outcomes has become a key strategy in the English NHS to ensure accountability and improve the quality of care. Much of the evidence that supported the design of the strategy originates from the USA. This report aims to assess how the evidence on public reporting could be harnessed for cross-country translation of this health system strategy; in particular, to gauge the expected results of the UK surgeon outcome initiative and to propose criteria that elucidate that prerequisites and factors that are needed to public reporting effective.

Suggested Citation

  • Behrendt, Katja & Groene, Oliver, 2016. "Mechanisms and effects of public reporting of surgeon outcomes: A systematic review of the literature," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 120(10), pages 1151-1161.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:120:y:2016:i:10:p:1151-1161
    DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.08.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cacace, Mirella & Ettelt, Stefanie & Mays, Nicholas & Nolte, Ellen, 2013. "Assessing quality in cross-country comparisons of health systems and policies: Towards a set of generic quality criteria," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 156-162.
    2. Jonathan T. Kolstad, 2013. "Information and Quality when Motivation is Intrinsic: Evidence from Surgeon Report Cards," NBER Working Papers 18804, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. David Dranove & Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan & Mark Satterthwaite, 2003. "Is More Information Better? The Effects of "Report Cards" on Health Care Providers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 555-588, June.
    4. David Moher & Alessandro Liberati & Jennifer Tetzlaff & Douglas G Altman & The PRISMA Group, 2009. "Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA Statement," PLOS Medicine, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(7), pages 1-6, July.
    5. Mukamel, D.B. & Murthy, A.S. & Weimer, D.L., 2000. "Racial differences in access to high-quality cardiac surgeons," American Journal of Public Health, American Public Health Association, vol. 90(11), pages 1774-1777.
    6. L. Fasolo & M. Galetto & E. Turina, 2013. "A pragmatic approach to evaluate alternative indicators to GDP," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 633-657, February.
    7. Jonathan T. Kolstad, 2013. "Information and Quality When Motivation Is Intrinsic: Evidence from Surgeon Report Cards," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(7), pages 2875-2910, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tello, Juan E. & Barbazza, Erica & Waddell, Kerry, 2020. "Review of 128 quality of care mechanisms: A framework and mapping for health system stewards," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 12-24.

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