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Partisan theory in forest nature conservation policy: Empirical evidence based on four German conflict issues

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  • Göhrs, Max
  • Hubo, Christiane
  • Krott, Max

Abstract

During the last decades, political parties have still appeared as an almost unknown factor within the substantial expansion of topics in forest policy research. While discriminating between green, state/protection and market/use orientated parties, this study aims to reveal the influence of different governing parties on forest nature conservation policy in Germany, contributing to partisan theory. The analysis covers 247 politically relevant cases between 1998 and 2018 in 15 German Bundesländer (regional level). The analysis model distinguishes between positive, negative and non-decisions, linking results of governing parties' activities in the agenda-setting and the policy-formulation phases of the policy process. It examines the manifestos of the governing parties and the results of the government's actions concerning four of the main conflict issues. Both the demands in manifestos and the policy outputs are evaluated using the interests of the forest and the nature conservation policy sector as a benchmark. As a result, two-thirds of the non-decisions arrived at during issue-relevant periods led to a status quo, as well as 6% of demands blocked, and 27% were positive decisions that led to a renewed policy output. Among these, only few corresponded to the interests of nature conservation. In proportion to their government participation, the Greens have contributed most frequently to policy outputs, and they have contributed the most to nature-conservation oriented outputs. The small liberal party, FDP, is the corresponding counterpart and fosters forest interests the most, but it has governed only seldom. The two major parties are more balanced. The SPD, as a state-orientated party, clearly leans towards nature conservation, whereas the CDU/CSU presents a market-orientated party, and prefers forest interests. In conclusion, political parties make a significant difference in German forest nature conservation policy. The details on the parties contribute empirical insight into partisan theory in environmental policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Göhrs, Max & Hubo, Christiane & Krott, Max, 2021. "Partisan theory in forest nature conservation policy: Empirical evidence based on four German conflict issues," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:forpol:v:127:y:2021:i:c:s1389934121000599
    DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2021.102453
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