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Hidden loan losses, moral hazard and financial crises

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  • Niinimaki, J.-P.

Abstract

This paper introduces two methods of hiding loan losses and analyzes how they affect a bank's loan interest income, payments on deposits, liquidity and moral hazard. The analysis reveals that a hiding method represents a Ponzi scheme. Contrary to classic theory, e.g. Diamond (1984), moral hazard may arise even though a bank's loan portfolio is diversified. Alternative instruments to eliminate hiding are investigated. Under specific circumstances, a Ponzi scheme may provide a socially optimal method to create liquidity and prevent a failure of a solvent but illiquid bank.

Suggested Citation

  • Niinimaki, J.-P., 2012. "Hidden loan losses, moral hazard and financial crises," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 1-14.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finsta:v:8:y:2012:i:1:p:1-14
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2009.08.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Demian Macedo & Victor Troster, 2021. "Liquidity shocks and interbank market failures: the role of deposit flights, non-performing loans, and competition," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 16(4), pages 705-746, October.
    2. Ristolainen, Kim, 2018. "Getting better? The effect of the single supervisory mechanism on banks' loan loss reporting and loan loss reserves," Research Discussion Papers 11/2018, Bank of Finland.
    3. Xueer Chen & Chao Wang, 2021. "Information Disclosure in China’s Rising Securitization Market," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-29, December.
    4. George Kladakis & Lei Chen & Sotirios K. Bellos, 2022. "Wholesale funding and liquidity creation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 59(4), pages 1501-1524, November.
    5. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2018_011 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Ristolainen, Kim, 2018. "Getting better? The effect of the single supervisory mechanism on banks' loan loss reporting and loan loss reserves," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 11/2018, Bank of Finland.
    7. Zhu, Anding & Fu, Peihua & Zhang, Qinghe & Chen, Zhenyue, 2017. "Ponzi scheme diffusion in complex networks," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 479(C), pages 128-136.
    8. Emilio Abad-Segura & Mariana-Daniela González-Zamar, 2020. "Global Research Trends in Financial Transactions," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-32, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking; Evergreening; Deposit insurance; Liquidity; Forbearance lending;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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