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Policy uncertainty and bank bailouts

Author

Listed:
  • Caliendo, Frank N.
  • Guo, Nick L.
  • Smith, Jason M.

Abstract

We model the effect of bank bailouts on portfolio choices and welfare. Banks sell bonds to leverage investment in risky projects and households buy bonds under rational expectations about default risk. Bailouts induce greater leverage but reduce equilibrium interest rates. The interest rate effect dominates the leverage effect and bailouts lead to fewer bank failures. Bailouts are efficient but not Pareto optimal: bailouts increase social welfare by mitigating uninsurable risk, which helps banks but hurts households since the insurance gains are not worth the price households must pay to finance the bailout.

Suggested Citation

  • Caliendo, Frank N. & Guo, Nick L. & Smith, Jason M., 2018. "Policy uncertainty and bank bailouts," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 111-125.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finmar:v:39:y:2018:i:c:p:111-125
    DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2018.01.003
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    Cited by:

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    2. Karanasos, M. & Yfanti, S., 2021. "On the Economic fundamentals behind the Dynamic Equicorrelations among Asset classes: Global evidence from Equities, Real estate, and Commodities," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    3. M. Karanasos & S. Yfanti & J. Hunter, 2022. "Emerging stock market volatility and economic fundamentals: the importance of US uncertainty spillovers, financial and health crises," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 313(2), pages 1077-1116, June.
    4. Philippe Oster, 2020. "Contingent Convertible bond literature review: making everything and nothing possible?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(4), pages 343-381, December.
    5. Tran, Dung Viet & Hassan, M. Kabir & Alam, Ahmed W. & Pezzo, Luca & Abdul-Majid, Mariani, 2021. "Economic policy uncertainty, agency problem, and funding structure: Evidence from U.S. banking industry," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    6. Guglielmo Maria Caporale & Menelaos Karanasos & Stavroula Yfanti, 2019. "Macro-Financial Linkages in the High-Frequency Domain: The Effects of Uncertainty on Realized Volatility," CESifo Working Paper Series 8000, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Portfolio choice; Welfare; Bailouts; Policy uncertainty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts

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