IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finlet/v71y2025ics1544612324014594.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Are venture capitalists monitors or claptrap players in IPOs? New evidence from an emerging market

Author

Listed:
  • Ye, Xiaojie
  • Yang, Dan
  • Zhong, Jiaqin

Abstract

This study investigates the role of venture capitalists (VCs) in initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Chinese Sci-Tech Innovation Board, where VCs are highly concentrated. We find that VC-backed firms are likelier to succeed in IPOs; however, they exhibit greater IPO underpricing and perform poorly post-IPO. Findings support the grandstanding model. We identify that VC-backed firms do not receive fewer IPO inquiries, and the young-VC group has greater effects on IPO underpricing and post-IPO performance. Further, we explore the well-known A-share Main Board situation but obtain different results.

Suggested Citation

  • Ye, Xiaojie & Yang, Dan & Zhong, Jiaqin, 2025. "Are venture capitalists monitors or claptrap players in IPOs? New evidence from an emerging market," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:71:y:2025:i:c:s1544612324014594
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2024.106430
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612324014594
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.frl.2024.106430?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Venture capitalists; IPO; Sci-tech innovation board; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:71:y:2025:i:c:s1544612324014594. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/frl .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.