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Enhancing external oversight: The complementary role of regulatory minority shareholders in China

Author

Listed:
  • Huang, Shengyuan
  • Li, Junhong
  • Yang, Xiaoguang
  • Zhou, Ye

Abstract

In 2014 the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC) was set up to serve as a government-backed entity to represent minority shareholders. Does CSISC achieve its role as a complementary external regulator? We present empirical evidence to show that CSISC can effectively alleviate the severity of the minority shareholder expropriation problem. Further, the effect is particularly noticeable in firms that lack measures to prevent misconduct by blockholders, which implies that CSISC significantly complements existing external regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Huang, Shengyuan & Li, Junhong & Yang, Xiaoguang & Zhou, Ye, 2024. "Enhancing external oversight: The complementary role of regulatory minority shareholders in China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:65:y:2024:i:c:s1544612324005518
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2024.105521
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    China securities investor services center; Tunneling; Minority shareholder protection; External regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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