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Policy signals, credibility and market expectations: Evidence from the Chinese bond market

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  • Li, Na
  • Feng, Meile
  • Liu, Rong

Abstract

Based on Chinese bond market transaction data, we study the effects of the Chinese Zeroing Hidden Debt (ZHD) policy on non-pilot regions in 2021 from a market guarantee expectations viewpoint. We find that the market selectively believes more in the bailout signal released by the ZHD pilot than in no-bailout signal, leading to an increase in implicit guarantee expectations instead of a decrease, which is contrary to the original policy intention. And it also has the heterogeneity of this selective belief psychology. We reveal that the market's trust in policy signals distorts policy effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Na & Feng, Meile & Liu, Rong, 2023. "Policy signals, credibility and market expectations: Evidence from the Chinese bond market," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(PA).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:58:y:2023:i:pa:s1544612323007596
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2023.104387
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timothy Goodspeed, 2002. "Bailouts in a Federation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(4), pages 409-421, August.
    2. O'Hara, Maureen & Shaw, Wayne, 1990. "Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being "Too Big to Fail."," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(5), pages 1587-1600, December.
    3. Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine & Alexey Levkov, 2010. "Big Bad Banks? The Winners and Losers from Bank Deregulation in the United States," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(5), pages 1637-1667, October.
    4. Russell Cooper & Kalin Nikolov, 2018. "Government Debt And Banking Fragility: The Spreading Of Strategic Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1905-1925, November.
    5. Cabrera, Matias & Dwyer, Gerald P. & Samartín-Saénz, Margarita, 2016. "Government finances and bank bailouts: Evidence from European stock markets," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(PB), pages 169-179.
    6. Feld, Lars P. & Kalb, Alexander & Moessinger, Marc-Daniel & Osterloh, Steffen, 2017. "Sovereign bond market reactions to no-bailout clauses and fiscal rules – The Swiss experience," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 319-343.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wan, Rui & Fan, Wencheng & Wang, Xiaoping, 2024. "Local government financing vehicle restructuring, implicit government guarantees and debt financing costs: Evidence from the Chinese municipal corporate bond market," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 48(2).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Policy signals; Credibility; Market guarantee expectations; Asymmetric effects;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

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