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Unique equilibrium in a model of takeovers involving block trades and tender offers

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  • Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl
  • Baek, Sangkyu

Abstract

Small shareholders face coordination problems during takeovers. Without common knowledge of a bidder’s negotiation ability with an incumbent blockholder in support of a takeover, the probability of takeover success is uniquely determined if the private information available to small shareholders regarding the bidder’s negotiation ability is precise enough. An analysis of the unique equilibrium demonstrates that the earmarked freeze-out amount and the expected amount of abnormal returns affect the takeover’s outcome. Moreover, the effect of the blockholder’s size on the takeover’s outcome is determined by the relative size of the earmarked freeze-out amount and the expected amount of abnormal returns.

Suggested Citation

  • Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl & Baek, Sangkyu, 2015. "Unique equilibrium in a model of takeovers involving block trades and tender offers," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 208-214.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:15:y:2015:i:c:p:208-214
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2015.09.011
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert Marquez & Bilge Yılmaz, 2012. "Takeover Bidding and Shareholder Information," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 1-27.
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    3. Schwert, G. William, 1996. "Markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 153-192, June.
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    5. Robert Marquez & Bilge Yılmaz, 2008. "Information and Efficiency in Tender Offers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(5), pages 1075-1101, September.
    6. Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 1998. "Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 172-204, February.
    7. Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 2000. "Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(2), pages 647-677, April.
    8. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Armando Gomes, 2024. "Takeovers, Freezeouts, and Risk Arbitrage," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(1), pages 1-27, January.
    2. Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl & Park, Junghum, 2023. "A large creditor in contagious liquidity crises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Takeover; Tender offer; Global game; Blockholder; Freeze-out; Abnormal returns;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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