IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finlet/v14y2015icp117-127.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Price strategies in a vertically differentiated mutual fund market

Author

Listed:
  • Lemeunier, Sébastien M.
  • Charléty, Patricia

Abstract

Several academic studies show that mutual funds set their prices in a strategic way according to their level of quality. This study examines a market in which two vertically differentiated mutual funds compete. Their price strategies are determined for the cases with complete and incomplete information. Our results show that mutual funds prefer to set their prices sequentially and that they are then indifferent to being the first or the second mover. With incomplete information, the presence of a lower quality mutual fund compels the high quality mutual fund to set lower prices at small levels of quality difference.

Suggested Citation

  • Lemeunier, Sébastien M. & Charléty, Patricia, 2015. "Price strategies in a vertically differentiated mutual fund market," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 14(C), pages 117-127.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:14:y:2015:i:c:p:117-127
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2015.05.008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612315000525
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.frl.2015.05.008?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Berkowitz, Michael K. & Kotowitz, Yehuda, 2002. "Managerial quality and the structure of management expenses in the US mutual fund industry," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 315-330.
    2. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, April.
    3. Kubler, Dorothea & Muller, Wieland, 2002. "Simultaneous and sequential price competition in heterogeneous duopoly markets: experimental evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(10), pages 1437-1460, December.
    4. Susan E. K. Christoffersen & David K. Musto, 2002. "Demand Curves and the Pricing of Money Management," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(5), pages 1499-1524.
    5. Javier Gil‐Bazo & Pablo Ruiz‐Verdú, 2009. "The Relation between Price and Performance in the Mutual Fund Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(5), pages 2153-2183, October.
    6. Gil-Bazo, Javier & Ruiz-Verdú, Pablo, 2008. "When cheaper is better: Fee determination in the market for equity mutual funds," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 871-885, September.
    7. Malkiel, Burton G, 1995. "Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(2), pages 549-572, June.
    8. Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean & Lu Zheng, 2005. "Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Effects of Expenses on Mutual Fund Flows," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(6), pages 2095-2120, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lemeunier, Sébastien Michel, 2021. "Information Asymmetry and the Mutual Fund Market," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 440-448.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lemeunier, Sébastien Michel, 2021. "Information Asymmetry and the Mutual Fund Market," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 440-448.
    2. Casavecchia, Lorenzo & Hulley, Hardy, 2018. "Are mutual fund investors paying for noise?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 8-23.
    3. Vidal, Marta & Vidal-García, Javier & Lean, Hooi Hooi & Uddin, Gazi Salah, 2015. "The relation between fees and return predictability in the mutual fund industry," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 260-270.
    4. Javier Vidal-García & Marta Vidal & Sabri Boubaker & Majdi Hassan, 2018. "The efficiency of mutual funds," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 267(1), pages 555-584, August.
    5. Lang, Gunnar & Köhler, Matthias, 2011. "How does the domiciliation decision affect mutual fund fees?," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-085, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. Massa, Massimo & Cheng, Si & Zhang, Hong, 2021. "Tax Evasion and Market Efficiency: Evidence from the FATCA and Offshore Mutual Funds," CEPR Discussion Papers 15747, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Mattia Landoni & Stephen P. Zeldes, 2020. "Should the Government be Paying Investment Fees on $3 Trillion of Tax-Deferred Retirement Assets?," NBER Working Papers 26700, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Mark Grinblatt & Seppo Ikäheimo & Matti Keloharju & Samuli Knüpfer, 2016. "IQ and Mutual Fund Choice," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(4), pages 924-944, April.
    9. F. Douglas Foster & Geoffrey J. Warren, 2015. "Why Might Investors Choose Active Management?," Journal of Behavioral Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 20-39, January.
    10. Parida, Sitikantha & Tang, Zhenyang, 2018. "Price competition in the mutual fund industry," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 29-39.
    11. Mercedes Alda & Luis Ferruz, 2012. "The Role of Fees in Pension Fund Performance. Evidence from Spain," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 62(6), pages 518-535, December.
    12. Ana C. Díaz†Mendoza & Germán López†Espinosa & Miguel A. Martínez, 2014. "The Efficiency of Performance†Based Fee Funds," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 20(4), pages 825-855, September.
    13. Teresa Corzo Santamaría & Carlos Martinez de Ibarreta & Juan Rodriguez Calvo, 2018. "Timid performance fees in mutual funds," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 19(1), pages 64-77, January.
    14. Hitzemann, Steffen & Sokolinski, Stanislav & Tai, Mingzhu, 2022. "Paying for beta: Leverage demand and asset management fees," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 105-128.
    15. Han, Jae-Joon & Kang, Kyeong-Hoon & Won, Seungyeon, 2013. "Fund expenses and vertical structures of the fund industry," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 856-864.
    16. Navone, Marco, 2012. "Reprint of Investors’ distraction and strategic repricing decisions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(10), pages 2729-2741.
    17. Bailey, Warren & Kumar, Alok & Ng, David, 2010. "Behavioral Biases of Mutual Fund Investors," Working Papers 10-23, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    18. Anufriev, Mikhail & Bao, Te & Sutan, Angela & Tuinstra, Jan, 2019. "Fee structure and mutual fund choice: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 449-474.
    19. Anginer,Deniz & Han,Snow Xue & Yildizhan,Celim, 2017. "Do individual investors ignore transaction costs ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 8098, The World Bank.
    20. Babalos, Vassilios & Kostakis, Alexandros & Philippas, Nikolaos, 2009. "Managing mutual funds or managing expense ratios? Evidence from the Greek fund industry," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 256-272, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vertical differentiation; Product quality; Mutual funds;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:14:y:2015:i:c:p:117-127. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/frl .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.