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Transaction-based government-business relationship via government customer

Author

Listed:
  • Song, Peixin
  • Teng, Fei
  • Xin, Yu
  • Xu, Liping

Abstract

Transaction-based government-business relationship (GBR) can be established when the government serves as a company's customer. This study investigates the consequences and mechanisms of this type of GBR. We find that companies with government customers receive more subsidies, due to both signalling effect and rent-seeking effect. As China's anti-corruption campaign tries to disconnect relation-based GBR and eliminate rent-seeking, transaction-based GBR survives. In the post anti-corruption campaign period, the rent-seeking effect of the transaction-based GBR weakens, but the signalling effect remains, and the government subsidy efficiency improves. This study sheds lights on the economics of transaction-based GBR which is largely ignored in the existing literature and reveals the effects of the interactions of anti-corruption and business transactions.

Suggested Citation

  • Song, Peixin & Teng, Fei & Xin, Yu & Xu, Liping, 2025. "Transaction-based government-business relationship via government customer," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:97:y:2025:i:c:s1057521924007270
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103795
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Government-business relationship; Government customers; Government subsidies; Anti-corruption campaign;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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